One of the most common questions asked of employment lawyers is how to safely sack an employee or director who is suspected of being on the take.  It is a question that often cascades down to forensic accountants who are asked to provide financial evidence for the frauds or assist with tracing and recovering the money.  Often, such fraud specialists will be asked to assist with the disciplinary process and also with providing a pivot for the subsequent civil or criminal action.

One thing that generally becomes obvious when asked to help out is that an organisation seems to be very indignant that a trusted member of the business could turn out to be a thief.  However, nearly always the problem has been created by the business itself, usually because no heed has been taken whatsoever to the risk of fraud.

There is a commonly recounted saying that only 10% of the population are criminally minded, but that only a similar amount of 10% are truly law abiding.  The rest of the population 80% are usually good unless motive and opportunity are put in their way.

Motive and opportunity – the most significant drivers of fraud – far more important than having a criminal mindset in the first place.  To see how this works – take a pretty common situation where a financial director uses his director’s current account (correctly) to record any personal spending.  At the end of the financial year he raises a bonus large enough after tax to clear the current account.

This is a pretty common occurrence and many business owners do the same. But what if the finance director is the person who is trusted with all the accounting function and the other directors, often not so financially astute, leave the money side to him?  If the bonus is not authorised then this is effectively theft.

The finance director may argue that he has posted similar bonuses to the other directors’ accounts – and shows them their accounts in credit. But this is a paper accounting figure and the business may not be able to afford to pay the sums owing to the other directors – yet the finance directo has had the benefit of the expenditure throughout the year.

If the company policy does not have controls to prevent the above, it is possible that the finance director will escape sanction and it will be hard to dismiss him.  It is important where one person is given overall control of a finacial function that there are some controls in place to make the person answerable. For instance, there will be limits to spending (cheque writing, credit card payments, bank mandates etc) without second or even third director approval. There will be a regular publication of directors’ current accounts and any payments or bonuses over and above contractually agreed amount must have general (and minuted) board approval.

In my work as a forensic accountant I see too many instances where a couple of business owners or directors suddenly realise that a fellow director has overstepped the trust they have been given. They want his blood but in fact in many cases they have simply given him too much opportunity and when motive arises – and being short of money can arise very easily for all manner of reasons – it is only human nature for the vast majority of people to succumb to the temptation!

For some time there has been a general feeling held by public and private sector fraud practitioners that the issue of fraud in the UK was not treated as seriously as it should. Campaigns by bodies such as the Association of Chief Police Officers (“ACPO”), the highly successful regional fraud fora and many others, have gradually raised both the public and the Government’s  awareness of the serious threat that fraud is to individuals, organisations and the economy as a whole. As a result the Government commissioned a 2006 Fraud Review following which in 2008 the Attorney General’s office ring fenced a budget of £29 million to establish a National Strategic Fraud Authority (“NSFA”). Somewhere along the line the new body changed its name to the National Fraud Authority (“NFA”) with a dedicated website at: http://www.attorneygeneral.gov.uk/nfa

There has been little news in the ensuing period concerning the NFA’s activities. Appointments of interim and permanent chief executives were well advertised as with all political posts. One of the first outputs seems to be a survey of the level of fraud in the UK that was published in January 2010. It was this survey that announced that fraud cost the UK some £30.2 billion per year that reminded me of the NFA’s existence and made me wonder what they were currently doing to help deal with the problem of fraud.

It does seem that one of the Authority’s tasks is to roll out details of the progress that they are making together with the general anti-fraud message at various relevant gatherings around the UK. These include speaking slots at the different Fraud Fora events that are held around the country. Therefore it was with much interest that the North West Fraud Forum’s annual conference was attended on 11 February 2010 at the DeVere Whites Hotel in Bolton.

Two out of three talks during the morning session were related to the NFA. However, the very first talk was on a different subject – an interesting piece by Lancashire MP Rosie Cooper, who related a personal experience of identity theft fraud. The talk highlighted the weak and ineffective response the authorities  have historically made to reports of such fraud and Rosie and the audience (which included over 100 respected public and private sector fraud practitioners from around the UK) eagerly awaited the NFA’s report as to how their new thrust would help frustrated victims of fraud like Rosie.

Unfortunately the NFA’s chief executive Dr Bernard Herdan could not make the conference and a last minute substitute of his colleague Cordia Lewis was made. Cordia was an Australian librarian with an MBA. She began her talk be reiterating private sector fraud statistics that had been compiled by the leading accountancy firm KPMG.

Her speech included details of the NFA’s intention to compile a regular Annual Fraud Indicator and an update of the newly established fraud reporting functions of “Action Fraud” for individuals and SMEs or the “National Fraud Intelligence Bureau” for larger organisations and fraud regulators.

Her message was - that if Rosie had experienced identity fraud now she would be able to report the matter to Action Fraud. However, this caused a storm of response from the audience with questions along the line of “do we stop reporting fraud to the police?” and “is this not another level of beaurocracy being inserted into the system?”

The next speaker had a recent example of how the reporting process worked.  Detective Superintendent Steve Clarke of the City of London Police headed up one of this squad’s six fraud groups and which was also the lead force in the coordinating the efforts of the NFA. He also headed up the NFA’s National Fraud Intelligence Bureau – the reporting point for major frauds. Steve related the case of Focus Clothing which the City of London is now investigating. This case which has been in the news resulted from over 50 calls to the NFA’s fraud helpline from individuals who had not received goods they had bought online from Focus.

It does seem that there is a lot of talk and good intentions from the NFA but certainly the audience at the North West Fraud Forum were not convinced that reporting a fraud to them would result in any more action than if the fraud was reported to the police or other front line fraud regulator. I discussed the matter with a solicitor, a government company inspector and a private sector fraud investigator all on my table at the conference. Together with my own views as a forensic accountant specialising in fraud matters, the consensus was that the £29 million would be better spent on funding more dedicated fraud squad officers in the various regional police forces!  Only time will tell.

By: Mark Jenner – Forensic Accountant

In October 2008 the Attorney General’s Office in the UK established the National Fraud Strategic Authority (NFSA) as a result of its Fraud Review in 2006. Being true to form for government agencies it has already had its first change of name to the National Fraud Authority (NFA)!

The NFA web site does not appear to work and very little information appears to be forthcoming from a Google search. It appears that the National Fraud Reporting Council (NFRC), whose NFRC web site also appears to be inoperative, is still embryonic in its development.

In 2008 the UK government allocated £29 million to put into place the various recommendations resulting in the decision to establish the NFA and NFRC. The City of London Police is to take the lead role in investigating serious and complex fraud and are tasked with helping other police forces with their investigations. They are working with the government to establish the NFRC.

Nothing much seems to be happening at present. News broke in 2009 about the appointment of Bernard Herdan as the full time chief executive of the NFSA (or NFA) to spearhead the coordination of inter organisation efforts against the growing problem of fraud. Herdan’s provenance is as an interim chief executive at the Securities Industry Authority since 2006, prior to that having spent some seven years as an executive director at the Identity and Passport Service. The distinct lack of a broad serious fraud experience does rather smack of this being a political appointment of a crony by Baroness Scotland (the Attorney General).

Although nothing much seemsto be occuring, there are one or two reports attributed to the NFA – National Fraud Authority.

For example in its first Annual Fraud Indicator report the NFA estimates that fraud costs the UK £30 billion per year – almost twice the previous estimates of some £17 billion. They say that the highest sectors of fraud loss are:

• Tax fraud at £15.2 billion
• Consumer scams at £3.5 billion
• Insurance fraud at £2 billion
• Mortgage fraud £1 billion

These figures should be viewed with some suspicion. There have been a number of estimates of the level of fraud in the UK over the past few years, many endorsed by the government. These are usually between around £40 billion and £100 billion. In addition, every fraud survey usually caveats their results saying that they are likely to be on the low side because of the hidden nature of fraud and the fact that much is not reported. The estimates do not include money laundering or hiding the proceeds of other crimes such as drugs, trafficing and extortion.

If the truth be known, the level of fraud as a proportion of the economy is huge but will never be accurately estimated.

Take the mortgage fraud figure of £1 billion for example. I was involved in a mortgage fraud case worth around £100 million. During the course of my investigations I began to understand how great the problem was. There were 100s of other property developers and others undertaking the very same tyoe of business that I was looking at. In fact it seemed to be the case that the way the UK plc was being run was fraudulent! Much of the toxic debt in the UK today results from overvalued properties and freely given loans without due diligence. In the past one to five years the annual level of mortgage fraud was well in excess of £1 billion.

Tax fraud is another example which must be viewed carefully. The level of tax evasion is not widely understood, especially by HMRC. I recall other cases over the past six or so years ago where I investigated a number of different support publishers. These companies pretend to represent good causes and charities and sell expensive advertising space in diaries, wall planners and directories. Many of the companies were closed down by the authorities as a result of the investigations, but likely sprang up immediately afterwards under a different name (phoenix companies).

The common factor between these companies was that they all employed teams of tele sales operatives to sell their advertising space. Every person was employed on a self employed basis and responsible for their own tax. Most never declared any of their commission earnings and many were also on supplementary benefit. I attempted to present my revelations to HMRC. Many of their junior managers were interested and tried to arrange a meeting for me with a senior policy maker – but none were interested. I was told that the UK would have to wait for new legislation. This meant that anybody interested in preventing such whole scale tax loss (as this practice ran much further than just the small sector I was investigating) would need to start lobbying members of parliament! It seemed that HMRC was only interested in applying its duties by the book – not looking to plug an obvious gap.

Much of the tax fraud in the quoted figures comes from Value Added Tax evasion – though if we think that HMRC have solved the carousel fraud problem (missing trader inter community fraud – MTIC fraud) by introducing reverse VAT charges on mobile phones, computer chips and now carbon credits, we are sadly mistaken. A recent investigation that I was involved in revealed that the spiders web of businesses involved in VAT fraud across the UK is huge, and the commodities exploited range through everything that can be traded – I have seen clothing, textiles, furniture, household goods, electronics, books, dvds, food supplements, spectacles, drugs……………..

I do hope that the figures presented by the NFA have not used too much of my tax money! There is a feeling that £29 million of funding would be better spent developing individual economic crime units and fraud squads around the uk. Fraud prevention and fraud detection at the coal face is money better spent than the development of even larger public sector agencies and quangos!  A couple of new well trained financial investigators in each regional police force together with all the supplementary resources and technology required including access to proper experienced forensic accountants – would be money better spent.